AI governance’s authority gap: Why titles aren’t solving the accountability problem
A practical response is to treat AI governance as an operating model backed by enforceable controls, not as a committee structure. That means defining who owns standards centrally, who accepts business risk locally, and which controls must be implemented consistently across identity, data access, workflow approvals, monitoring, and revocation. The important trade-off is speed versus control: excessive centralization can stall adoption, but excessive federation can create inconsistent enforcement and hidden exposure.
The article also points to a shift in evidence expectations. Insurers, auditors, and enterprise customers are increasingly interested in proof that controls operate in production, not in policy statements alone. That raises the bar for metrics. Instead of tracking policy completion or meeting cadence, leaders should ask:
- Does every AI system have a named accountable owner?
- Can sensitive actions be constrained at execution time?
- How quickly can access or agent authority be revoked everywhere it runs?
- Do vendor contracts map to technical controls and monitoring?
The immediate leadership question is whether the enterprise has a unified control plane for AI risk decisions, or merely a collection of role titles and review forums. If governance cannot translate a decision into system behavior quickly and consistently, the organization has an authority gap that org charts alone will not fix.
There’s a peculiar split developing between who has authority and who has responsibility in AI governance. Authority over key decisions appears to be consolidating at the executive level, but the responsibility of governing AI on a day-to-day basis is spreading across the enterprise.
This can cause material problems: Responsibility without authority leaves staff impotent to act, while authority without responsibility untethers executives from full accountability. Ultimately, this widening gap can leave AI governance worse off than it was before — and despite the existence of several key AI roles in most organizations, the situation persists.
For example, IBM’s 2026 CEO study found that 76% of surveyed organizations have a chief AI officer (CAIO), up from 26% in 2025. Other proposed titles, including chief AI agent officer and chief regulatory officer, are popping up, suggesting further C-suite expansion. Yet, 79% of the executives surveyed said they are decentralizing decision-making and distributing accountability as AI assumes a larger enterprise-wide role. Having the title doesn’t automatically equate to owning the responsibility.
The governance angle of AI is no more transparent. The seemingly obvious title of chief governance officer (CGO) is already in use, but with different meanings depending on which organization you’re talking to.
Traditionally associated with corporate governance and board oversight, the CGO function resides within the legal department or general counsel’s office at 84% of companies surveyed by the Society for Corporate Governance. Meanwhile, South Korea’s SK Telecom uses the CGO title within its AI governance structure. Such overlapping responsibilities and terminology could introduce more confusion rather than clarity, even as organizations try to establish responsibility hierarchies.
For CIOs, the meaningful question is less about who gets another title and more about who can make those increasingly distributed controls function together.
The real authority is in the systems
One of the challenges of this new landscape is that agentic AI requires an entirely different governance approach. Written AI policies establish expectations, but they cannot independently prevent an agent from accessing restricted information or executing an unauthorized transaction.
To keep up with these requirements, interviews with CIOs, CTOs, and governance specialists point to a new development: AI governance is migrating from policy documents and committees into the operational systems that enforce decisions.
“In most enterprises, AI governance lives in two places that rarely talk to each other: a policy PDF owned by a committee, and a set of OAuth scopes , service accounts, and API keys configured by whoever shipped the integration,” said Bapuji Koraganti, a cybersecurity engineer at a large American mass media, telecommunications, entertainment and tech company.
Consequential approval, Koraganti argued, often occurs when someone grants credentials rather than when a governance committee authorizes deployment.
This may work with more controlled systems, but AI agents complicate that arrangement because they can operate across applications, access sensitive information and initiate transactions without repeated human intervention.
Making a strong distinction between authorizing an agent and authorizing a particular transaction is a better tactic. An agent permitted to access financial systems, for example, shouldn’t automatically be allowed to change supplier banking information or release payments, says Patrick Parker, chief innovation officer at identity governance provider Omada.
Such restrictions must be enforced when actions occur, not simply described in policy.
“An enterprise can have a complete library of AI policies and still lack the wiring between governance decisions and enforcement,” said Parker.
The shift in enforcement changes what governance means operationally. Instead of relying on blanket approvals and attestations, organizations need enforceable permissions, transaction limits, monitoring and the ability to revoke an agent’s authority.
“Sensitive actions need authorization enforced outside the model, at execution time. Where approval is required, it must bind to the actual beneficiary, amount, destination or data scope,” said Parker. “Approval to pay one supplier cannot become permission to pay another simply because the same agent and tool are involved.”
Insurers and procurement raise the stakes
Governance is also a rising financial and contractual consideration. Insurance brokerage Gallagher reports that some insurers are using tier-based pricing and adjusting coverage limits based on applicants’ answers to AI governance questions. The company’s spring 2026 commercial insurance report also indicates that deficiencies in AI risk management readiness are beginning to affect pricing.
That approach doesn’t establish a universal premium surcharge for weak AI governance. Insurers’ approaches vary, and overall cyber insurance pricing trends can differ from the treatment of individual AI-related exposures. Still, the development creates an incentive for enterprises to demonstrate that governance controls exist and operate effectively.
However, CIOs must be careful not to assume that stronger AI governance automatically produces lower premiums. Insurers evaluate specific exposures, policy terms, and coverage limitations when setting their prices.
“Much like requiring MFA, insurance companies are starting to look at evidence of protections for AI in place and not just attestation. That includes proof that an organization can recover its data and systems if an AI agent or AI-driven attack causes damage, just as insurers began asking for proof of tested backups during the rise of ransomware,” said David Gildea, VP of product for generative AI at cyber resilience provider Druva.
Procurement and legal departments are also under pressure to enact governance strategy , through the mechanism of vendor contracts. Data-use provisions, audit rights, liability allocation and contractual protections around changing AI capabilities are among the sensitive issues in vendor contracts that require renewed attention , to protect the enterprise from assuming undue risk, according to Allison Spagnolo, senior managing director, deputy general counsel, and chief privacy officer at security services firm Guidepost Solutions.
Meanwhile, Savio Lobo, CIO at managed services provider Ensono, argues that AI vendor agreements should be treated as part of enterprise risk management rather than as isolated technology purchases. Procurement manages commercial negotiations, legal establishes contractual terms, security and privacy define risk requirements and technology or business owners determine whether the remaining risk is acceptable, he said.
But contractual restrictions alone cannot prevent an AI system from performing an unauthorized action. Enterprises must connect those obligations to technical controls and operational oversight.
“The important thing is that AI vendor review cannot become a separate universe from third-party risk management. It needs additional AI-specific questions, but it should plug into the enterprise controls,” Lobo added.
The executive authority problem
As governance becomes embedded in more business functions, its organizational ownership becomes harder to define. Still, clearly someone needs to be in charge.
At Ensono, Lobo works alongside a CTO and CAIO. Their collaboration illustrates how enterprises can coordinate AI governance across leadership without transferring every decision to one executive.
The CAIO, with the assistance of the CIO and the CTO, establishes strategy, standards and adoption priorities. However, privileged access, contractual liability and business process automation remain subject to the authority of executives responsible for those specific areas.
“Creating a new C-level title for every emerging issue is unlikely to solve AI governance,” Lobo said. Nor will it eliminate existing accountabilities, he added.
At companies without such a clear structure, the growing division of responsibilities becomes more consequential as AI decisions move into individual business units. A business leader may approve an automated workflow, but security controls its permissions, technology manages its operating environment and legal determines contractual obligations. No single participant necessarily has authority over the others — and the resulting vacuum of an ultimate accountable authority can be untenable.
In the eyes of Anthony Habayeb, CEO and co-founder of AI governance platform Monitaur, the ultimate enterprise accountability lies with the CEO and board, which establish the organization’s risk appetite.
“Can one executive own AI accountability for the whole company? No. Can a CAIO orchestrate it, with risk and audit verifying it? Yes,” Habayeb said.
“The right structure ultimately leads to an accountable business executive saying yes [or] no and that decision is informed by underlying work done by experts distributed across technology, risk, security, and other disciplines, who have each taken ownership of performing key governance controls,” Habayeb explained.
The challenge is coordinating decisions without obscuring who has the authority to make them or who remains accountable for their consequences.
What replaces another governance title?
One emerging answer is to introduce a common governance operating model, rather than another executive position.
While there isn’t a single operating model for AI governance, said Tom Jenkins, vice president of strategic partnerships at decision intelligence platform RelationalAI, he said his company is increasingly seeing a federated approach in which standards are established centrally while business units retain responsibility for their outcomes.
“That makes sense organizationally, but it creates a technical challenge: how do you ensure that the same policies, business rules and constraints apply across different applications and agents?” Jenkins said.
Consistent enforcement across applications, data environments and AI agents is required. Jenkins said he sees the CIO or chief data and AI officer roles becoming increasingly responsible for establishing the common architecture that makes distributed governance manageable.
Lobo advocated for the use of a unified control plane incorporating AI inventories, risk classifications, named owners, identity standards, monitoring and operational evidence. “Then the individual functions can innovate inside those boundaries,” he said.
Instead of counting approved policies or governance meetings, CIOs should ask how many AI systems have accountable owners, meet access requirements and can demonstrate that controls are working.
Parker proposed another metric to measure: Governance latency, or the time between an authorization or revocation decision and its effective enforcement across production systems. Such measures reveal whether governance exists only in organizational assignments or actually controls AI behavior.
The next phase of AI governance may produce additional executive titles. The executive arrangement itself will likely vary: Some enterprises will expand the CAIO’s responsibilities; others will place coordination under the CIO or distribute authority through established technology and risk leadership . Regardless, enterprises will be tempted to establish authority through updated organizational hierarchies.
But creating a new position without the budget, decision rights and operational authority needed to resolve conflicts will merely add another participant to an already fragmented approval process.
Instead, leadership should turn their eyes to a more consequential development that is already underway: Governance is becoming an operating discipline. And enterprises must determine who has the authority to keep its many moving parts working together.
Enjoyed this article? Sign up for our newsletter to receive regular insights and stay connected.
